European restrictive measures – Three-year renewal: review remains the essential safeguard
The context in which the latest renewal acts were adopted is entirely unprecedented in EU law. Restrictive measures are a powerful and legitimate tool of the common foreign and security policy in which the respect for the rule of law is both an objective and a requirement for the EU institutions. However, these measures – which are intended to help restore the rule of law where it is under attack – must themselves respect those very safeguards and values. The recent extension is open to criticism in this regard, but the safeguards provided by EU law should prevent any abuses. Although the renewal was initially expected by 15 September 2026, by Decision (CFSP) 2026/2103 the renewal was postponed to the 22 September 2026 after particularly lengthy and difficult negotiations between Member States. That delay reflects the political and legal sensitivity of the issues.
These incidents also demonstrate – though this should, in fact, have been obvious for a long time – that, in this area too, political considerations can take precedence over the primary objective of sanctions. Apart from this delay, what is obviously striking is the highly surprising renewal for a period of three years, which deals a severe blow to the preventive and provisional nature of the restrictive measures. Whilst, until now, the Russian sanctions regime had been characterized by a very short renewal period of six months (rather than the usual one-year period), it has now, without warning, been extended to three years!
Against that background, the shift towards a longer renewal period of three years,brought about by Decision (CFSP) 2026/2161, is not necessarily adverse to listed persons. It may interrupt the pre-existing procedural cycle in which successive short renewal acts were adopted while annulment proceedings remain pending, thereby limiting the practical effect of an annulment concerning an earlier act. It reinforces the need to preserve effective individual safeguards throughout the entire period of application, in particular through a genuine and continuous review of each invididual listing where new evidence or changed circumstances are submitted to the Council’s attention.
1. The legal basis confirms that procedural safeguards are structural
The point of departure is not an abstract challenge to the legal basis of the restrictive-measures regime. Decision (CFSP) 2014/145 is adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, while Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 is based on Article 215 TFEU. Importantly, Article 215(3) TFEU expressly provides that acts adopted under that provision “shall include necessary provisions on legal safeguards”. The right to seek reconsideration is therefore not an incidental administrative practice. It forms part of the safeguards built into the legal architecture governing individual listings.
Those safeguards are reflected in parallel provisions. Article 14(3) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides that, where observations are submitted or substantial new evidence is presented, the Council is to review its decision and inform the person, entity or body concerned accordingly. Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP establishes the corresponding obligation under the CFSP decision.
Those provisions establish an ongoing process in which the possibilities for review are in no way limited to a request made at the end of the validity of the decision and just before a possible renewal .
2. A longer formal duration does not create a three-year review-free period
Thirty-six months cannot mean “no review for three years”. The formal period of application only determines the outer temporal framework of the measures. The obligation of reconsideration requires the Council to engage with relevant developments affecting the continued legal and factual basis of a particular listing. If circumstances materially change during the three-year period, or if new evidence calls the existing reasons into question, the Council must assess that material, update its analysis and draw the appropriate consequences, pursuant to article 14(3) of Regulation (EU) 269/2014.
This follows from the provisional and conservatory nature of restrictive measures, as recognised by the caselaw. Their continued validity remains dependent on the persistence of the factual and legal circumstances that justified their adoption and on the continuing necessity of maintaining them. In Abramovich v Council (T-358/25, paragraph 157), the General Court reiterated that, during periodic review, the Council must conduct an updated assessment of the situation and evaluate the impact of the measures. The same formulation appears in Ovsyannikov v Council (T-714/20, paragraph 67) and Ilunga Luyoyo v Council (T-108/21, paragraph 55). A longer formal horizon should therefore increase, rather than reduce, the importance of a genuinely current individual assessment.
3. The Member States themselves have insisted on constant and thorough review
The joint declarations made in connection with the March and September 2025 renewals confirm that the participating Member States did not regard renewal as a substitute for review. While supporting the extension of the restrictive measures, they stressed that the legal soundness of listings, designations and supporting evidence is essential to the measures’ effectiveness, sustainability and credibility. They called for evidence to be updated regularly, for legally unsound listings to be removed, and for the Council to examine “constantly and thoroughly” the legal soundness of each individual listing in light of the Court’s case-law and any relevant new evidence. The point is therefore simple: a longer-duration act does not secure legal robustness unless it is accompanied by continuous, individualised scrutiny.
4. Procedural avenues remain open notwithstanding the three-year renewal
The adoption of a three-year renewal act does not close the procedural avenues available to listed persons. First, the new acts of 22 September 2026 2may themselves be challenged by way of a request for annulment before the General Court, or, where appropriate, by way of a statement of modification adapting pending proceedings to the new legal context.
Second, and in parallel, the listed person may continue to activate the reconsideration mechanism under Article 14(3) of Regulation No 269/2014 and Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP whenever observations or substantial new evidence are submitted. As indicated above, that pathway is not subordinated to the next formal renewal date. It is precisely designed to prevent the maintenance of listings on an outdated factual or legal basis during the period of application of the measures.
Third, an annulment judgment would raise the further question of the measures which the Council must take in order to comply with Article 266 TFEU. Even if one were to take the view that the decision of 22 September 2026 formally continues to subsist vis-à-vis the applicant, Article 266 TFEU would still require the Council to draw all necessary consequences from the annulment judgment. In practical terms, that would at least require a genuine reassessment of the applicant’s listing and, where the annulled reasons can no longer sustain the measure, the adoption of delisting measures or a new decision based on an updated and legally sufficient assessment, which would itself be open to challenge. The regular submission of updated information to the Council should logically lead the Council to review the case and rule on the need to update the list. Where applicable, a negative decision by the Council in this regard, or a failure to respond, may be regarded as an act causing prejudice that is open to judicial review.
5. Practical consequence: activate the review mechanism in each individual case
The litigation strategy should therefore be individual and evidence-led. Rather than focusing primarily on seeking the abstract illegality of a three-year framework through an action for annulment, listed persons should be more proactive and build and submit a continuous record of material developments: changes in ownership, management or economic activity; termination of relationships relied upon in the statement of reasons;; relevant judicial developments; and matters bearing on necessity or proportionality. In parallel evidencing the lack of reliability or currency of the Council’s sources remains necessary. Each submission should identify the applicable listing criterion, explain why the existing reasons no longer satisfy it, and expressly request review under Article 14(3) of Regulation No 269/2014 and Article 3(3) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP.
The counterpart is stricter institutional and judicial accountability. Indeed, the Council must take genuinely into consideration the substantial new material submitted and adapt accordingly its reasoning or the listing where required.
Moreover, as a second consequence, the General Court, for its part, should apply an even more rigorous standard of review. Once the provisional and preventive nature of the measure no longer holds, the restrictions in question effectively become long-term sanctions and penal safeguards come into play. This line of argument should be developed on a case-by-case basis in each individual file, rather than by challenging the legality of the regime as such.
The General Court, should indeed assess whether the reasons remain current, specific and sufficiently substantiated, particularly where the measure is capable of operating for a prolonged period without a new formal renewal act. A failure to engage with new evidence, an unreasonable delay, reliance on obsolete material or the maintenance of reasons that no longer establish an individual link to the relevant criterion may then be challenged as a concrete failure of review, an inadequate statement of reasons, a manifest error of assessment or a disproportionate continuation of the measure.
In conclusion, whilst the renewal for a period of three years may appear to be in direct conflict with the very concept of restrictive measures as an instrument of the rule of law, there is every reason to believe that the balances established by the treaties and by case law will prevent measures which are, by definition, provisional and preventive from being transformed into genuine criminal sanctions.
It is incumbent upon those concerned who contest their inclusion on the list to lodge an application for annulment with the General Court in good time against the renewal of 22 September (as it will no longer be possible to make up for this at the next renewal, since there will be no further renewals before 22 September 2029…) and also to gather all the necessary information to compel the Council to reconsider the situation. these developments illustrate why the move to a three-year framework cannot be understood as reducing the intensity of review; on the contrary, it makes real-time reassessment and effective judicial control all the more necessary.
DALDEWOLF EU LAW TEAM